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T

THE

E D I T O R

his issue of Hemisphere went to press just weeks before the US presidential elections. As the
campaign reached its high point and the candidates debated their positions on foreign poli
cy and domestic issues, we heard very little about Latin America. At most, the region
received only passing notice in the context of national security, with concern over the possi
bility of terrorists entering this country via the Mexican border.

This situation is very different from the one we saw four years ago. In the 2000 campaign, President Bush

staked his claim to foreign policy expertise on his familiarity with Mexico as governor of Texas. Here at
Florida International University, we remember his visit to our campus in the summer of 2000, when he

pledged to make Latin America the centerpiece of his administration’s international relations.
For a short time, it looked like that might really happen. At the April 2001 Summit of the Americas in
Quebec City, Canada, President Bush was a strong advocate of the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA). And many people on both sides of the US-Mexican border felt a surge of hope at the sight of him
shaking hands with Vicente Fox over a proposed immigration accord in September of that same year. But
just days after their meeting, the September 11 terrorist attacks completely changed the nations focus.
Three years later, with attention still concentrated on national security and Iraq, immigration has moved far
down on the list of political priorities and the FTAA talks have stalled.
In this issue of Hemisphere, we have chosen to examine the current state of some of the most important
themes in US-Latin American relations: trade and economic ties (including remittances); immigration and
labor; democratization; and, of course, security policy, including terrorism, illegal narcotics and, especially,
border issues. Likewise, because of the overwhelming importance of the US relationship with Mexico, our
book review focuses on this topic.
I would like to extend a special thanks to our contributors, especially Marfa Teresa Romero and Patricio
Crooker, who wrote special reports for us on the important referendum processes in Venezuela and Bolivia
this summer and their consequences for those countries, the wider Latin American region and relations with
the United States.
We also feature a special essay by Tony Maingot, Hemisphere’s founding editor, who retired from the facul
ty of Florida International University this year. He has gone back to the very first piece he wrote for this
magazine 16 years ago and updated his survey of the main trends in Caribbean politics and economics.
We are proud to have compiled such an extensive archive of commentary and analysis over the past decade
and a half and we are enthusiastic about continuing that tradition as new leaders come to power and region
al events unfold. Here in our editorial offices we are already looking ahead to our next issue, which will
focus on Brazil. As always, we have a wealth of material to work with.
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The Caribbean, 15 Years Later
by Anthony P. Maingot

n the inaugural issue of
Hemisphere (fall 1988), I
described the Caribbean as a
region of “sovereign but
balkanized and fragile states.”
I argued that the region might be
reaching the limit of its privileged
economic arrangements with both
Europe and the United States. The
situation as I write 15 years later is
even more alarming than I had
anticipated: The independent states
which compose the region’s premier
economic arrangement, CARICOM, are in danger of being mar
ginalized not only globally but
indeed in their own backyard.
Both economic and political factors
explain this worrisome trend.
From the economic point of
view, the erosion of the privileged
protocols which the CARICOM
countries enjoyed has been dramat
ic. Gone are the CBI, the use of
“936” funds from Puerto Rico’s dis
mantled arrangement with the US
Treasury, and the aid and non
reciprocal arrangements of the vari
ous Lome conventions. SELA—
the Latin American Economic
System—has turned out to be a
paper tiger and whatever advantages
are derived from the much-touted
Association of Caribbean States,
economic benefits are not among
them. Replacing all these arduous
ly negotiated agreements is the
Cotonou Agreement, composed of
a series of Economic Partnership
Agreements which emphasize “free
trade” rather than aid and one-way
non-reciprocal trade. I put free
trade in quotes because even as the
doctrine of free trade is being foist
ed on small economies, large
4
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Caribbean economies dependent on traditional exports such as sugar, bananas
and minerals are at the mercy o f “fr ee trade” dom inated by US and European
agricultural subsidies.
economies make a mockery of the
principle by continuing the heavy
subsidy of their agricultural com
modities. As such, the inability of
the regional economies to break
their dependence on traditional
exports (bananas, sugar, minerals)
and to dismantle the “infant indus
try” provisions which make so
much of their manufacturing
uncompetitive converts the empha

sis on free trade into a perilous
affair. Beyond those issues which
are hardly susceptible to immediate
and effective decision-making,
other structural realities have little
or nothing to do with political will.
The long and short of it is that size
does matter. Start with population
(read, labor force and markets): In
a future Free Trade Area of the
Americas, CARICOM (including

Reports: The Caribbean

the eight million Haitians) will rep
resent 1.74% of that 800 millionperson market. The total GDP of
CARICOM is a mere 0.23% of the
US GDP and the openness of the
Caribbean economies continues
much as before all the talk of “com
mon markets.” Intra-CARICOM
trade is still only 15% of its total,
and fully 89% of that is represented
by petrochemical exports from
Trinidad and Tobago.
All these structural realities ought
to give pause to any residual beliefs
that there is still negotiating
mileage to be had from playing the
Third World card. The painful
drama of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) ruling on the
banana issue demonstrated that
when large US or European compa
nies join forces with large Latin
American producers, Caribbean
Lilliputs get squashed. Now it is
sugar which will prove bitter pick
ings. The Caribbean exports 1.6
million tons, or 3.6%, of the global
trade in sugar. No matter: When
Brazil, Australia and Thailand went
after Europe’s subsidies of its mas
sive beet sugar industry, Caribbean
entreaties that their minute sugar
protocols be excluded (as “third
party rights”) from any WTO deci
sion fell on deaf “Third World”
ears. The rules of the game took
no account of size. Even the nor
mally staid Financial Times (August
6, 2004) weighed in with the blan
ket judgment that the WTO had
struck “a blow for justice and good
sense.” The Caribbean response
was immediate. The Jamaicans
lamented that the “solemn commit
ments” and “sanctity” of the
Cotonou protocol had been violat
ed {Jamaica Observer, August 9,
2004), the Guyanese declared that
the WTO decision “clearly shows
the ruthlessness of world trade”
(.Stabroek News, August 9, 2004),
and the Barbadians decried the

“tunnel vision” of the WTO. All,
of course, to no avail. When it
comes to opposing “free trade,”
small economies are spitting into
the wind.
But if a sort of economic law of
necessity shields Caribbean elites
from taking all the blame for the
vagaries of world trade, the same
cannot be said about regional
geopolitics. If there are limits to
the sovereign actions of small states,
there are also constraints on the
hegemonic inclinations of major
ones, even in their historical spheres
of influence. This is especially the
case in the post-Cold War era and
it also explains why some of the
recent CARICOM geopolitical pos
turing harbors serious risks. I am
not referring to the CARICOM
states’ principled stand on trade
and relations with Cuba; that
stance is shared in some way by all
except the perpetually short-sighted
(when it comes to Cuba) US. I am
referring to the obdurate support
for President Jean Bertrand Aristide
of Haiti, as misguided a stance as
we have ever seen coming from the
generally agile and wily diplomacy
of the islands. Two explanations
appear plausible. First, since Haiti
is a full member of CARICOM,
the organization logically felt that it
had a duty to stand by a democratic
partner especially when, and here
the second reason kicks in, the
removal of Aristide was seen as a
blatant act of US imperial arro
gance. The problem is that neither
argument is watertight. Aristide
was governing in full defiance of
Haitian constitutional mandates,
and the decision not to send troops
to keep him in power (the only way
to avoid his defenestration) was as
much a French project as it was
American. The CARICOM diplo
matic pirouettes did nothing to
save Aristide and certainly have
done nothing to enhance the com

munity’s prestige. To the extent
that there is peacekeeping and
nation-building taking place in
Haiti, it is a Latin American, not
Caribbean, project. The decisive
actions of Brazil and its Mercosur
allies represent a clear geopolitical
watershed in the area and have for
all practical purposes sidelined
Haiti’s Caribbean neighbors. It is a
telling point that the recent unani
mous vote of the 19-member Rio
Pact to sustain a “long-term” peace
mission in Haiti included the
assenting vote of Guyana, which
presently holds the rotating
Caribbean seat in the Pact. This is
the same Guyana that in CARI
COM forums was adamantly—and
quite vocally—in favor of the
restoration of Aristide.
The conclusion has to be that
while small states might well be
powerless to withstand the econom
ic pressures of a globalized world,
the same does not hold for geopo
litical decisions. The latter field
allows for political adroitness and
diplomatic finesse to increase “sym
bolic” or “soft” power. Past leaders
of the Caribbean had substantial
reserves of those qualities. It is too
bad that the present leadership is
presiding over the erosion of that
magnificent legacy.
Fifteen years after the first
Hemisphere editorial, the region
appears more balkanized and feeble
than ever. ■

Anthony P. M aingot is Hemisphere’s
fou n d in g editor an d Professor
Emeritus o f Sociology at Florida
International University. Most
recently, he is the co-author, with
Wilfredo Lozano, o f “The United
States an d the Caribbean:
Transforming Hegemony and
Sovereignty” (New York: Routledge,
forthcom ing).
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Venezuela after the Referendum
by M aria Teresa Romero

US policy toward Chavez is
unlikely to change

bservers are debating
the course US for
eign policy will take
toward Venezuela
after the August 15
referendum, which reaffirmed the
mandate of President Hugo
leanings and authoritarian tenden
Chavez. Teams from the
cies. The question is whether he
Organization of American States
will use his referendum victory to
(OAS) and the Carter Center
intensify his policies of political
endorsed the official results, which
repression and domestic confronta
showed approximately 59% of par
tion, institutional dismantling and
ticipants voting “no” to the opposi
human rights violations. Chavez’s
tion’s attempt to recall Chavez from
friendship with Fidel Castro and
power. In the past two years,
other Latin American radical
despite important commercial (oil)
groups is well known; after the
ties, the more than four-decadesAugust vote, he was congratulated
long “special” relationship between
by Colombia’s FARC and ELN
the US and Venezuela has degener
guerrillas, as well as a new
ated into a climate of tension and
Venezuelan guerrilla group, the
confrontation. At first glance, it
Bolivarian Liberation Front (FBL,
seems possible that the consolida
in Spanish). Leaders from both
tion and relegitimation of the cur
major US parties worry that Chavez
rent Venezuelan government could
could become Castro’s right-hand
lead to a more moderate and
man in South America, aggravating
friendly mutual foreign policy and a
tensions with the US and fueling
normalization of bilateral relations.
conflicts in neighboring countries.
This trend could be reversed at any
moment, however, depending on
A Polarized Society
the policies of the Chavez govern
Immediately after the referen
ment not only toward the United
dum, Chavez promised to safeguard
States, but toward the rest of the
Venezuela’s foreign economic and
hemisphere and Venezuelan society
political ties, especially with the
itself. The US continues to distrust
United States. His foreign minister,
Chavez; Washington may have
Jesus A. Perez, reiterated Venezuela’s
accepted, and formally legitimated,
desire for friendly international
Chavez’s government, but it has not
relations. Before long, however,
embraced his domestic and interna
Chavez was back to his habitual
tional revolutionary pretensions.
anti-imperialist rhetoric. Albeit in
Republicans and Democrats alike
a more moderate tone than the one
await the next steps of the
he adopted for the referendum
Venezuelan government. Both par
campaign, he inveighed against the
ties are familiar with Chavez’s
Bush administration, its policy
unpredictable behavior, his brand of
toward Latin America and the
military populism, his strong leftist
model of liberal democracy that,

O

according to Chavez, the US “is
trying to impose on the rest of the
world.”
The behavior of the Venezuelan
government before and during the
referendum process and the opposi
tion charges of fraud and irregulari
ties raised considerable concern in
the US government, civil society
and the press. In fact, the Bush
administration delayed its official
reaction to the referendum until
Venezuela’s National Electoral
Council (CNE) completed an audit
of the results and the OAS and
Carter Center presented their
reports. The US accepted the out
come, but it vehemently opposed
voting on the draft resolution
before the Permanent Council of
the OAS, which urged “all actors to
accept and respect the results of the
referendum.”
Whether or not the opposition’s
cries of fraud are ever substantiated
in a way that satisfies the interna
tional community, the United
States knows—and the OAS
Secretary General, Cesar Gaviria,
acknowledged before that organiza
tion’s Permanent Council—that
numerous problems occurred before
and during the referendum process.
These included abuse of power,
manipulation, delay tactics, intimi
dation, attempts at censorship and
blatant irregularities (illegal migra
tion of voters and failure to consult
voting lists, elimination of numer-
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ous voters from the voting registry,
addition of 230,000 new voters
without clear documentation in the
two months preceding the referen
dum, registration of more than 1.5
million foreigners, exclusion of
18,000 non-Chavistas, etc.), as well
as the underlying problem of gov
ernment control of the CNE, as
various independent reports and
international figures invited to
observe the proceedings noted.
Indeed, a report by Harvard
University and the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology concluded
that the likelihood of fraud in the
referendum was 99%.
During the voting Venezuelans
also had to endure, as never before
in their democratic history, an
onslaught of populism and demagoguery. The government openly
manipulated votes during the cam
paign, taking advantage of high oil
prices to step up the pace of pop
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ulist handouts. In the weeks lead
ing up to the vote, the president
distributed $1.6 billion in oil
money to the poor. At the Vatican,
Venezuelan Cardinal Jose Castillo
Lara complained that Chavez was
buying the votes of the country’s
poorest citizens, paying $50-$60 in
exchange for a pledge to vote “no”
to the recall. The Church and
other sectors of Venezuelan society
also denounced government spend
ing on electoral advertising.
The United States is well aware
that the referendum has done noth
ing to bridge the great rifts between
Venezuelans and that in fact, more
polarization, crisis and division are
likely. Even if the allegations of
fraud are never proven, a significant
percentage of the population
remains distrustful of the govern
ment, state institutions and the
electoral authorities. The referen
dum, instead of coming closer to

resolving the crisis in Venezuela,
may have deepened it. Assuming
that the CNE’s official results are
accurate, 41% of Venezuelans
(those who voted yes to the recall)
firmly oppose the Chavez govern
ment, and another 30% (those who
abstained) are indifferent. If
Chavez does not dramatically
change course and win over those
who voted against him or didn’t
vote at all, there can be no peace—
social or political—in Venezuela.
Poverty also remains a persistent
problem. Despite government
spending, poverty has not been alle
viated in Venezuela, but in fact has
increased. W ith oil revenues at
their highest point in history, the
poverty rate rose from 52% in 1999
to 72% in the first quarter of 2004.
At the moment, despite the many
calls for reconciliation and dia
logue, it is difficult to imagine a
180-degree shift in the govern

Reports: Venezuela

ment’s conduct or its policies. In
his victory speech, Chavez made it
clear that the vote to keep him in
power was not only an endorse
ment of his government and its rev
olutionary policies, but also of its
“Bolivarian” ambitions for the
country and the continent. The
day after the referendum, govern
ment supporters attacked opposi
tion protesters, leaving one dead
and eight wounded. One week
later, the government withdrew
official recognition of the opposi
tion coalition’s Democratic
Coordinator, confirmed the sen
tences of political prisoners, and
began an aggressive campaign to
win upcoming state and municipal
elections. At the same time, the
government-friendly majority in the
National Assembly resumed its
practice of rubber-stamping bills
that, opposition and civil society
critics say, infringe on civil liberties,
especially freedom of expression
and property rights.
With Chavez legitimated and tri
umphant, and an opposition that
has been weakened but remains
fiercely committed in its hatred of
him, Venezuela’s future outlook is
less than heartening. We can
expect to see radicals from both
sides—government supporters and
opponents—dominate the more
moderate social and political groups
that defend the democratic system,
escalating the domestic confronta
tion. The scenario most people
would like to see—reconciliation,
political harmony, a transparent
and serious democratic process— is,
unfortunately, the one least likely to
occur; at least not the way things
seem at present.
“Venezuela Is Too Important for
Neglect”
Given these conditions, it is safe
to predict that Venezuela will con
tinue to be a source of concern for

the United States in both the short
and long terms. Whoever wins the
US presidential elections, George
W. Bush or John Kerry, he will be
obliged to keep an eye on
Venezuela and respond to develop
ments there. As the Washington
Post warned after the referendum,
“Venezuela is too important for
neglect.”
The new US president cannot
simply undo the damage to political
relations and, to a lesser degree,
trade between the two countries
over the last few years. Depending
on Chavez’s actions, the new US
leader can attempt to rebuild the
“special” bilateral relation that char
acterized US-Venezuelan relations
before Chavez took power, or, con
versely, take definitive action to dis
tance the US and perhaps even
break off diplomatic relations if
necessary (e.g., if Chavez poses a
serious threat to US or regional
security). In late June, less than
two months before the August 15
referendum, the US Senate held a
special hearing on the state of
democracy in Venezuela.
Republican and Democratic sena
tors, as well as high-ranking Bush
administration officials, expressed
doubts about the possibility of
holding a fair and transparent refer
endum process. Senator Bill
Nelson (D-FL) went so far as to
warn that “if the government of
Venezuela continues with these
positions (attacking the US and
collaborating with enemy govern
ments and alleged terrorist groups),
then we will have no choice but to
declare the Venezuelan government
to be hostile and unfriendly to the
United States.”
Nelson’s words reflect a bipartisan
consensus on the issue of
Venezuela. The potential threat the
Chavez government poses to US
and hemispheric security, and the
importance of Venezuela’s oil

resources, have created a remarkable
similarity of opinion among
Republicans and Democrats.
Despite the strategic differences
that come to the fore during an
election year, the two parties are
likely to adopt a common foreign
policy toward Venezuela in the case
of a serious crisis. This consensus is
unlikely to change regardless of the
outcome of the November elec
tions.
Chavez’s Bolivarian Revolution
represents a difficult challenge for
the United States, and it is likely to
do so for some time. The current
government in Venezuela has tested
the commitment of the United
States—and all the members of the
OAS—to the principles of democ
racy. In general, both the US and
the OAS have responded slowly,
and weakly, to events in Venezuela,
due to a combination of economic
and geostrategic interests and the
complexities of dealing with an
authoritarian government that
poses as a democracy, came to
power through democratic means
and, thanks to the referendum,
enjoys renewed legitimacy.
Compared to the rest of the interAmerican community, however, the
United States has taken a responsi
ble and consistent approach to the
abuses and provocations of the
Chavez regime. ■

Maria Teresa Romero is a professor in
the Department o f International
Affairs at the Universidad Central de
Venezuela. She writes a regular col
umn fo r El Universal newspaper in
Caracas an d is director o f the political
analysis newsletter Vision Venezolana.
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A Victory for Democracy
by Patricio Crooker

dum happen, the president was
n Sunday, July 18,
pleased
2004,
the people
of with the impressive turnout
and
the
results, which empower the
Bolivia sent an impor
government
to exert greater control
tant message to the
over
the
nation’s
energy resources.
nation and the world
Despite
the
efforts
of radical leaders
when approximately 60 percent of
to
organize
opposition
to the popular
eligible voters went to the polls in
consult, the National Electoral Court
the country’s first democratic referen
brought off the voting in record time
dum. They were asked to answer yes
on a very low budget. From the
or no to a series of five questions
Andean highlands to the nation’s val
concerning whether and how Bolivia
leys and tropical regions, the
should export oil and natural gas.
Bolivian people used this opportuni
These questions played an important
ty to support a fragile democracy in a
role in the popular protests that
peaceful and orderly process.
drove President Gonzalo Sanchez de
With its new mandate, the govern
Lozada from power in October 2003
ment faces another battle, this time
and have continued to bedevil the
with oil companies and the Bolivian
new administration of Carlos Mesa.
Congress to create a new and just
After a battle to make the referen

O

President Carlos Mesa led an intense public relations campaign in fa vo r o f the yes vote.
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energy export law. Less than two
weeks after the referendum,
President Mesa began consultations
with the Congress to draft new legis
lation in response to the referendum.
The government’s prompt actions, in
conjunction with the well-ordered
referendum process itself, are intend
ed to send a positive image of Bolivia
after more than two years of protests,
deaths and violence in this poor
country, which has a wealth of natu
ral resources.
The October 2003 unrest repre
sented a call to Bolivia’s political par
ties to become more representative of
their constituents and to the govern
ment to be more transparent and
open about its policies—especially

Reports: Bolivia

Bolivians were asked to answer yes or no to a series o f fiv e questions concerning the country’s oil and natural gas exports.
concerning the export of energy
reserves, a contentious issue in a
country with a history of foreign
exploitation of its natural resources.
In organizing the referendum, the
Mesa administration faced consider
able pressure from leftist groups to
include an option to nationalize the
nation’s energy sector, but the presi
dent was adamant in his views that
nationalization would be disastrous
for Bolivia. Some radical leaders
urged the public not to vote and
threatened to burn ballots and close
down voting locations.
Unfortunately, the national press
played an important role in inciting
these doubts, in some cases inflating
the threats and views of leaders in
the movement against the referen
dum. In the city of El Alto, where
most of the October 2003 revolts
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took place, the days leading up to
the vote were characterized by uncer
tainty as to the outcome and the
potential for more unrest. Even
there, however, international
observers and the international press
were impressed with the semblance
of order and popular participation.
Before all the polls had closed, as the
first results were coming in via the
media, some radical leaders—sur
prised by the high level of popular
participation and the clear victory of
the yes vote—backpedaled on their
threats and negative propaganda.
The real winners were those
Bolivians who participated in the ref
erendum and believe that democracy
is the only way to bring change for
the better.
The unusual case of having a presi
dent with no party base in Congress

made the referendum a unique but
dangerous opportunity for Bolivia.
To achieve the consensus to pass his
projects, Mesa led an intense public
relations campaign in favor of the yes
vote that explained the benefits of a
positive response to the referendum’s
five questions. His high public
approval ratings give him an impor
tant tool to pursue his agenda, while
the direct form of democracy repre
sented by the referendum gives
Bolivia an important opportunity to
solidify its young and damaged
democracy. For the first time in
more than 22 years of democracy,
Bolivians were asked to participate
directly in an important policy mak
ing decision. Although critics com
plained that some of the five ques
tions were too long or ambiguous,
the positive result helped to legit-

Reports: Bolivia

The results o f the referendum em pow
er the Mesa governm ent to exercise
greater control over the nations energy
resources.
imize Mesa’s government. The new
legislation being drafted will increase
the taxes and royalties of private
investors as well as the participation
of Bolivia’s national oil company,
YPFB. Investment is very low at the
moment as private oil investors close
ly monitor proposed changes to
Energy Law 1689, passed in 1996 by
the Sanchez de Lozada administra
tion.
The popular consult was a victory
for democracy, helping to unify
Bolivia and end speculation about a
division between the country’s west
ern and highland regions, where
most of the October 2003 protests
took place, and the east, where most
of the oil and gas fields are located.
The events of last fall forced changes
in the way politics work in Bolivia.
The July 2004 referendum is part of
those changes and raises hopes for a
more secure future for the country’s
democratic governance. ■

The voting was peaceful and orderly, even in the highland city o f El Alto, the site
o f most o f the violence leading up to President Gonzalo Sdnchez de Lozada’s resig
nation in October 2003.

Patricio Crooker is a photojournalist
based in Bolivia and a frequent con
tributor to Hemisphere.
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F E A T U R E S
Politics, Access and History
by James F. Siekmeier
s a college professor, I
once wrapped up a
class on modern Latin
American history by
putting General
Agusto Pinochet Ugarte of Chile
on trial for human rights abuses.
That is, one group of students was
assigned to prosecute, and another
to defend, his contentious 1973 to
1989 regime. The general was con
victed—revelations of torture
clinched the prosecution’s case—
but the battle was a tough, bitter
one. Pinochet’s defenders argued
that he saved Chileans from the
anarchic, atheistic Communism
that would have resulted if leftist
Salvador Allende Gossens (19701973) had remained in power.
This mock debate— not really
“mock,” since it was mid 1999 and
Pinochet was under house arrest in
Great Britain for human rights vio
lations—allowed the students to
glimpse the enduring pain and
powerful legacy of the Pinochet
regime, a legacy that has cast a long
shadow on Chilean history and USChilean relations.
Two months too late for the stu
dents in my class, in summer 1999,
the United States released the first
installment of a large cache of doc
uments pertaining to US-Chilean
relations from 1968-1991. This set
of material, the Chile Declassifica
tion Project (CDP) of 1998-2000,
was the result of an inter-agency
effort during one of the most diffi
cult periods in the history of rela
tions between the two countries.
Because the Pinochet period was
such a contentious one, many in
the United States felt that the
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release of the information was an
unstated moral obligation. The
world needed to know more about
what happened during the Pinochet
period; more specifically, about US
knowledge, support of, or complici
ty with Pinochet’s actions. In a
nation that has historically valued
openness as the first, necessary
step toward government accounta
bility, the CDP was, in the words
of one official who worked on the
project, an almost “cathartic experi
ence.”
“I Think You Are Entitled to
Know What Happened Back
Then, and How It Happened”
The United States decision to
declassify the CDP documents
came after about seven years of
post-Cold War (relative) calm and
nine years after the Chilean govern
ment had made the transition from
military dictatorship to democracy.
The catalyst was the startling arrest
of a notorious leader, but the back
ground to the decision is impor
tant.
Starting in 1997, the Spanish
government, under the terms of a
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty,
requested that the US share any
information it might have about
human rights violations under
Pinochet. A small group of Spanish
and Chilean officials worked
behind the scenes to build a case
against the Chilean general. Their
efforts culminated dramatically in
October 1998, when a team of
Spanish judges arrested Pinochet
for human rights violations com
mitted during his tenure as Chilean
head of state (he had been indicted

two years before). The arrest took
place in England, where Pinochet
had traveled for medical treatment.
The Spanish judges—headed at
first by Manuel Garcia Castellon
and later by Baltazar Garzon—
accused Pinochet of carrying out
“criminal activities...which [had] as
their object the physical elimina
tion, disappearance, or kidnapping
of thousands of persons, having
previously been subject to general
ized torture.”
Once Pinochet was arrested, the
United States found itself forced to
take sides. The Spanish had arrest
ed the former dictator but the
Chileans wanted to be the ones to
determine Pinochet’s fate. On the
one hand, Spain (and other
nations, along with relatives of US
citizens who were victims of
Pinochet’s repression and members
of the US Congress) wanted to try
Pinochet in a Spanish tribunal, in
part to set a precedent for universal
jurisdiction of repressive leaders.
The Chilean government, on the
other hand, was concerned that a
foreign trial of Pinochet would
inflame the country’s military.
Because of its covert action to
undermine the Allende regime and
support Pinochet, the US govern
ment found it impossible to ignore
the issue. Indeed, the US had been
involved in Chilean affairs since the
1960s, when US covert assistance
to Edward Frei Montlava, the
Christian Democratic presidential
candidate in 1964, comprised
about one-half of his campaign
budget. Some US officials sided
with the Spanish government and
its argument that Pinochet’s human
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The Chile Declassification Project o f1998-2000

La Moneda palace in Santiago, Chile on September 11, 1973, duirng the coup d ’e tat led by Augusto Pinochet against constitu
tional President Salvador Allende. Recently released documents shed light on the US role in Chile during and after the coup.
rights abuses had affected Chileans
and non-Chileans alike, and that
his arrest was a test case for interna
tional justice. Many US citizens
and the international human rights
community supported the idea of a
tribunal to bring to light more
information about Pinochet’s
human rights abuses. Other US
officials, however, argued that the
Chileans had the right to try their
notorious former general and head
of state.
In the end, the US sided with the
Chileans. Underlying this decision

was the fact that one of the corner
stones of the transition to democra
cy in South America in the 1980s
was amnesty for the heads of state
of former military regimes. Putting
Pinochet on trial broke a tacit
agreement (between the former dic
tators, Latin American society and
the US government) that crimes
against humanity committed by
South American military leaders
would not be prosecuted. The US
authorities knew their decision to
side with the Chileans would be
controversial. To placate US citi

zens—including families of the vic
tims of Pinochet’s repression—and
the international human rights
community, they decided to con
duct a thorough declassification of
US government documents.
The Clinton administration had
a history of declassifying docu
ments in an attempt to come to
terms with the past. In this case,
the divulging of historical informa
tion fit well with another adminis
tration policy: apologizing for US
misdeeds in Latin America during
the Cold War. On a visit to
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Central America in 1999, President
Clinton apologized for US aid to
repressive military regimes in
Guatemala from the 1960s through
the 1980s. A remarkable conflu
ence of events, therefore, propelled
the Chile Declassification Project:
the end of the Cold War in the
early 1990s; the Clinton adminis
tration’s penchant for openness and
apologies for US Cold War policies
that contributed to the deaths of
innocent people; the behind-thescenes work of the human rights
community and other advocates for
openness and their allies in the US
Congress; and—the catalyst— the
remarkable arrest of Pinochet at the
behest of a group of Spanish
judges. President Clinton succinct
ly summed up the goal of the
CDP: “I think you are entitled to
know what happened back then,
and how it happened.”
A Policy of Openness
The Chile Declassification
Project represented one of the
largest inter-agency declassifications
of foreign policy documents in the
history of this country.
Approximately 23,000 documents
were declassified. The project was
directed by a National Security
Council directive, or “tasker.”
According to Peter Kornbluh, the
author of a book on the project, the
point of the CDP was “to insist in
encouraging a consensus in Chile
on reinvigorating its truth and rec
onciliation process to address such
questions as the fate of the disap
peared.” The declassification
included three separate installments
of documents from the Department
of State, the Central Intelligence
Agency, the National Security
Council, the Department of
Defense, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Department of
Justice, and the National Archives
and Records Administration,
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The Chile Declassification Project brought to
light considerable evidence regarding ongoing
debates in American foreign policy about the
extent of US responsibility for the 1973 coup
that brought Pinochet to power, as well as US
knowledge of his governments subsequent
human rights abuses.
including the presidential libraries
of Nixon, Ford, Carter and Reagan.
The first installment contained
approximately 5,800 documents
from 1973 to 1978; the second,
about 1,100 documents from 1968
through 1973; and the third and
last, approximately 16,000 docu
ments covering the period from
1968 to 1991. The remarkable
thing about the project is that its
scope was expanded to include not
only Pinochet-era documents, but
also materials from before and even
after the general’s rule. (The docu
ments, released in 1999-2000, are
on the State Department’s website,
www.state.gov, under Freedom of
Information Act [FOIA],
Declassified Documents
Collections.)
Despite its path-breaking nature,
it is important to realize that the
CDP is not the only inter-agency
declassification project the US gov
ernment has conducted. Indeed, it
can only be understood in the con
text of other document release proj
ects. These have concerned indi
vidual countries, among them
Guatemala, El Salvador and
Argentina, as well as such wideranging topics as Nazi expropria
tions of Jewish assets during World
War II and the John F. Kennedy
assassination.
The CDP came into existence in
part because of a new trend toward

openness in the federal govern
ment. The Clinton administration
codified this policy of openness
with Executive Order 12958,
signed by the president on April
17, 1995. It shifted the burden of
proof regarding the secrecy of docu
ments from the parties requesting
access to those who produced the
documents. Previously, federal gov
ernment agencies could keep a doc
ument classified simply by asserting
that its release would hurt US
national security interests. E.O.
12958 required the agency that
produced a specific document to
explain why keeping it classified
was important to the nation’s secu
rity.
The Chilean project proved to be
unprecedented in many respects.
Despite some understandable dis
putes between agencies, the inter
agency process (coordinated by the
National Security Council) by
which the documents were pro
duced proved to be a model for
inter-agency cooperation. The
most high-profile dispute occurred
when the CIA changed its mind
about releasing some sensitive doc
uments, and then changed it back.
The CIA released a large number
of documents not only on
Pinochet’s human rights violations,
but also on US covert action in
Chile. The methodology of the
CIA’s review changed over time. At
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first, the document search and
declassification at the agency was
rather narrow, limited to CIA
knowledge of Pinochet’s human
rights abuses. Finding such docu
ments proved difficult, as the
agency’s files were organized by
operation or asset, not categories
such as “human rights.” The broad
language of the NSC tasker, howev
er, meant that the CIA could not
simply throw up its hands and
declare defeat. Since the tasker
called for the release of information
that had to do with “political vio
lence,” the search was necessarily
wide and deep. CIA officials
favored a narrow definition of
“political violence” that excluded
coups d’etat, but they lost that
argument. In the end, according to
one CIA officer who worked on the
CDP and who did not want to be
identified, virtually all covert action
was defined as a form of political
violence. According to this inter
pretation, the NSC tasker could
require that the CIA release docu
ments on US covert action in Chile
that were unrelated to CIA knowl
edge of Pinochet’s human rights
abuses.
Raising New Questions
“It’s not a part of American histo
ry we are proud of,” concluded
Secretary of State Colin Powell in
February 2003, referring to US
covert action in Chile in the early
1970s. Although not an official
apology like the ones issued by the
Clinton administration, the secre
tary’s comment is in that vein. The
anti-Allende activities of the US
government, and Washington’s sup
port of the Pinochet regime, reflect
ed disturbing tendencies in US for
eign policy—a crusading zeal to
change another nation’s policies to
more closely resonate with US val
ues; interference in the electoral
politics of an established democra

cy; and a virulent fear of left-wing
or radical change in a society where
the distribution of wealth had been
skewed towards the very wealthy
for centuries. But the CDP reveals
equally deep, but more positive
trends in US society: the idea that
openness can lead to greater under
standing, even learning from histo
ry, and that coming to terms with
the past can bring healthy reflection
on past excesses.
The CDP brought to light con
siderable evidence regarding ongo
ing debates in American foreign
policy about the extent of US
responsibility for the 1973 coup
that brought Pinochet to power, as
well as US knowledge of his gov
ernment’s subsequent human rights
abuses. Academics and politicians
will no doubt continue to debate
these questions in the future, but
the documents appear to show that
US government agencies had at
least some inkling of Pinochet’s
human rights violations.
Many scholars tend to see docu
ments as “smoking guns,” the
Rosetta stones that will allow them
to decipher all of US policy or
answer big historical questions. It
is important to step back and think
about who released a document and
why. Taking an even bigger step
back, it is also important to realize
that policymakers are capable of
writing documents that distort or
cover up the truth. But the fact
that scholars’ access to the Chilean
documents hinged on a political
decision—some would say political
expediency, given the US govern
ment’s desire to avoid an interna
tional trial of Pinochet—does not
detract from the truly remarkable
fact of their release.
The CDP also has implications
that go far beyond US-Chilean rela
tions from 1968-1991. For exam
ple, it revealed information about
Operation Condor, the informa

tion-sharing policies of a loose net
work of Southern Cone intelligence
agencies formed in the early to mid
1970s to fight communism and
“internal subversion” in Latin
America and elsewhere. Operation
Condor sponsored the first deadly
act of terror on US soil—the
September 1976 car bomb in
Washington, D.C. that killed the
former Chilean ambassador to the
United States, Orlando Letelier del
Solar.
The CDP does not give a full
accounting of the US knowledge
of, or role in, Operation Condor,
but the documents it contains rep
resent an important first step for
researchers interested in this period.
As scholars delve more deeply into
the information released under the
CDP, they are certain to find that
the documents it made available
raise (and may answer) important
questions concerning US foreign
policy that are not even being asked
now.
Above all, the CDP is an impor
tant educational resource. Only
through a careful study of the his
torical patterns of US diplomacy
can citizens make informed deci
sions about the successes and fail
ures of past US foreign policy.
Such knowledge is an important
factor in selecting our nation’s lead
ers and determining the future tone
of its international relations. ■

Jam es F. Siekmeier is a researcher at
the Office o f the Historian o f the US
D epartment o f State.
The ideas expressed here are the
author’s an d do not necessarily reflect
the policy o f the US Department o f
State. The author w ould like to
thank Peter Kornbluh, Catherine V.
Tall, Edward C. Keefer and Stephen
M. Streeter fo r helpful comments on
this paper.
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Gangsters and Prostitutes
by Vincent T. Gawronski
reat nations indeed
may have always acted
like gangsters and
small nations like pros
titutes, but the United
States also has some loyal friends.
Great Britain (at least, Prime
Minister Tony Blair), for example,
unwaveringly backed the US-led Iraq
war effort because of the longstand
ing “special relationship” between the
two countries. (Or, more cynical
observers would argue, because the
opportunity returned Great Britain
to a role “East of Suez” after a 30year absence.) Why, however, would
a regional grouping of relatively
small nation-states, which have
directly experienced US quasi-imperialism, politically and militarily sup
port the United States in Iraq?
Specifically, why would every Central
American government, in addition to
that of the Dominican Republic,
support the unilateral US decision to
invade Iraq when the UN Security
Council, Mexico and nearly all the
South American governments did
not—and when clear public majori
ties throughout the region, including
Central America itself, expressed
strong opposition to the invasion?
Three isthmus countries—El
Salvador, Honduras and
Nicaragua—went so far as to send
small troop contingents (with the
Dominican Republic) to Spains Plus
Ultra Battalion to assist in “stabiliza
tion missions,” humanitarian relief
and reconstruction efforts. Why
would they do this?
The answer lies in the evolving
nature of asymmetrical interAmerican relations, which are now
more intense and complicated than

G

Hemisphere Volume 14

“The great nations have always acted like
gangsters, and the small nations like prosti
tutes.”
—Stanley Kubrick
The Guardian , June 5, 1963
when classic dependency theory was
popular. Simply put, the Central
American and Dominican elites
committed their countries to sup
porting the United States because
they feared that even a neutral posi
tion on the Iraq invasion might irri
tate a notably sensitive, even cranky,
Bush administration. Too much was
at stake. Combined total merchan
dise trade between the five Central
American countries and the United
States exceeds $23 billion, and the
recent inclusion of the Dominican
Republic in the Central American
Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) will
bring the total to more than $32 bil
lion. With the hemisphere moving
toward a Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA), the governments
in power in Central America and the
Dominican Republic at the time of
the Iraq invasion were pro-United
States and pro-free trade, with cen
trist or conservative ruling political
parties (see Table 1 on page 20).
Given their orientation and fearful
of eventual US reprisals, conservative
and neoliberal elites felt compelled to
support US actions. This was easier
in the immediate aftermath of the
9/11 attacks, when world opinion
supported a military response.
Surveys conducted after 9/11 indi

cated that Latin American countries
with domestic terrorism experience
expressed greater support for the US
war on terror and had a higher opin
ion of the United States. The pat
tern was not uniform across the
region, however; as Marta Lagos
wrote in the International Journal o f
Public Opinion Research (spring
2003),

In general, Central American
countries have a much more favor
able (85 percent) opinion o f the
United States than the rest o f the
region (71 percent); some o f those
countries’ economies depend on dol
lars sent by relatives working in the
United States, which are a signifi
cant part o f the national income.
Their perception o f terrorism as a
world threat is higher (66percent)
than it is in South America (57
percent), much higher than in
Mexico (46 percent). Their soli
darity with the war against terror
ism is accordingly higher, reaching
almost one in two citizens o f the
Central American countries.
Opinions deteriorated as the Bush
administration pushed for Iraqi
“regime change,” which had little to
do with the war on terrorism.
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Asymmetrical inter-American relations
Nonetheless, a coalition of lesser
“powers” backed the United States by
sending troops, including Honduras
(370), El Salvador (360), the
Dominican Republic (300), and
Nicaragua (230).
One year after the invasion, eight
countries had more than 1,000
troops in Iraq. The United States, of
course, had nearly 135,000. Few
countries contributing troops expect
ed to be involved in combat opera
tions or to be directly attacked.
Their contributions were symbolic,
but the violent escalations of April
2004 and new socialist Prime
Minister Jose Zapatero’s decision to
withdraw Spanish troops forced
coalition members to reconsider their
commitments. Nicaragua decided
earlier not to replace troops in rota
tion for financial reasons. Honduras
and the Dominican Republic fol
lowed Spain’s lead, despite US diplo
matic pressures. El Salvador, for
now, will stay.
Historically, US relations with
Central America and the Dominican
Republic almost always have been
uneasy, but the United States can
now more easily coerce, reward and
punish its friends and allies than ever
before. For example, the US
Department of State’s list of 63
countries whose companies could
compete in bidding for reconstruc
tion projects in Iraq was limited to
those whose governments expressed
support for the US invasion. In
Latin America, only those countries
satisfying US Department of State
contract standards—Panama,
Honduras, El Salvador, Colombia
and the Dominican Republic—were
awarded bidding rights, and in the

end no company from these coun
tries made a bid.
Latin American Reactions to the
Iraq War
A Gallup International poll of 41
countries worldwide conducted after
the start of the Iraq invasion found
that Argentines, followed by
Uruguayans, opposed the invasion
most, as did nearly as many
Chileans and Peruvians in separate
surveys. Latinobarometro 2003
results showed that 87% of Latin
Americans surveyed held unfavor
able opinions of President Bush and
that negative images of the United
States had more than doubled since
2000 (from 14% to 31%).
Although 60% of Latin Americans
retained a positive image of the
United States, this was down from
71% in 2000. Interestingly, Central
Americans were inclined to be more
positive about the United States
(85%) than South Americans (65%)
and Mexicans (63%) in 2003.
Globally, few leaders voiced strong
support and solidarity for the
United States, but only the larger,
more significant countries were able
to stick to their principles. Along
with Chile, Mexico, a Latin
American member of the UN
Security Council, opposed the US
decision to invade Iraq. This soured
President Fox’s once close personal
relationship with President Bush,
who had declared early in his presi
dency that no other country was as
important to the United States as
Mexico. Many observers hoped for
significant progress during the two
leaders’ overlapping terms on trade,
drug trafficking and, especially,

immigration. Of course, 9/11
abruptly changed the Bush adminis
tration’s priorities, and the Fox gov
ernment’s principled stance on Iraq
temporarily damaged Mexico-US
relations. Some of Fox’s advisers
urged him to be more moderate but
Adolfo Aguilar, Mexico’s representa
tive on the UN Security Council,
said that Mexico would not be sub
ordinated to the United States and
was more concerned with develop
ing a mature— “not a prostituted”—
relationship with its neighbor to the
north. For its part, after opposing
the United States in the Security
Council, Chile became less vocal in
its criticism and President Ricardo
Lagos and his administration
refrained from direct challenges.
In marked contrast to most of
Latin America, every Central
American government, as well as
that of the Dominican Republic,
expressed support for the US-led
invasion. Of course, Plan Colombia
locked the Alvaro Uribe administra
tion into politically backing the
United States, although Colombia
did not send troops. Guatemala
considered sending some of its forces
but the government realized that it
could not bear the financial costs or
the domestic political opposition.
Panama also extended political sup
port but contributed no troops. For
50 years Costa Rica has not had a
national military, but still President
Abel Pacheco stated publicly: “I
would rather Iraqi children die than
Latin American and Costa Rican
children,” adding, “we are loyal allies
to a loyal friend.” Surveys indicated
that the majority of Costa Ricans
opposed his stance.
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T a b l e 1 : P r e s id e n t s , P o l i t i c a l P a r t ie s

Country

and

T h e ir I d e o l o g i c a l O

r ie n t a t io n s

Ideological Orientation
of Ruling Parties

President

Political Parties in Power (2003-2004)

Costa Rica

Abel Pacheco
(2002- )

Social Christian Unity Party (PUSC)

Alliance of Christian Democrats
and center-right conservatives

El Salvador

Francisco Flores
(1999-2004)
National Republican Alliance (ARENA)

Right-wing conservative

Alfonso Portillo
(2000-2004)

Guatemalan Republican Front

Authoritarian

Oscar Berger
(2004- )

Grand National Alliance

Alliance of liberals and
center-right conservatives

Honduras

Ricardo Maduro
(2002- )

National Party

Conservative

Nicaragua

Enrique Bolanos
(2001- )

Liberal Constitutionalist Party

Center-right conservative

Dominican
Republic

Hipolito Mejfa
(2000-2004)

Dominican Revolutionary Party

Social-Democrat

Tony Saca
(2004- )
Guatemala

Source: www.electionworld.org/

The Nicaraguan government
approved the deployment of troops
to join the “humanitarian assistance
task force,” but the leftist Sandinistas
considered it to be an “offense to
national dignity” and a CID-Gallup
poll found that more than 80% of
Nicaraguans opposed sending troops
to Iraq. Once nicknamed “USS
Honduras,” Honduras has long been
an ally of the United States with a
significant US military presence and
millions of dollars in US aid, espe
cially after Hurricane Mitch. The
Honduran government sent a mixed
battalion to conduct “stabilization
missions.”
President Francisco Flores of El
Salvador voiced strong support for
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the United States and his administra
tion’s troop contribution was an act
of thanks for the international com
munity’s backing of the 1992 peace
accords that ended the civil war in
that country. Of course, the leftist
FMLN fiercely opposed the decision,
but despite growing domestic oppo
sition to El Salvador’s involvement
the conservative ARENA stayed in
office after the March 2004 elec
tions. ARENA candidate Tony Saca
handily defeated former guerrilla
leader Shafik Handal because many
Salvadorans feared an FMLN victory
would stall economic growth and
endanger US-Salvadoran relations.
In campaign advertisements, the rul
ing party warned that the United

States could terminate the temporary
asylum status of Salvadorans, result
ing in thousands of deportations and
the loss of millions of dollars in
remittances.
The Importance of Remittances
The presence of so many Central
Americans and Dominicans in the
United States figured mightily in the
decision by these countries’ govern
ments to support the United States.
According to the US Census Bureau,
close to four million Central
Americans reside in the United States
and nearly half a million undocu
mented Salvadorans, Hondurans and
Nicaraguans have temporary protec
tive status. El Salvador and the
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Ta b l e 2 : T o t a l
as

GDP, HDI

P ercentage

of

R a n k in g ,

ODA R e c e iv e d

P e r C a p it a ,

and

N et

FDI I n f l o w s

GDP

Total GDP in
billions (2002)

Human
Development
Index Ranking
(2003)

ODA in
Millions
(2001 )

ODA Per
Capita in
Dollars
(2001 )

Net FDI
Inflows as
Percentage of
GDP (2001)

Costa Rica

$16.9

42

2.2

(•)

2.8

El Salvador

$14.3

105

234.5

37.1

1.9

Guatemala

$23.3

119

225.2

1.1

2.2

Honduras

$6.6

115

677.7

10.6

3.1

Nicaragua

$4.0

121

928.3

n/a

(•)

Dominican Republic

$21.2

94

105.4

12.4

5.6

Country

Source: United Nations Human Development Report 2003

Dominican Republic have the high
est percentages of their populations
in the United States and, along with
Mexico and Cuba, account for the
most foreign-born immigrants from
Latin America.
Remittances now surpass US
Official Development Assistance
(ODA) and foreign direct invest
ment (FDI) as Central Americas
most important source of foreign
capital. Often in partnership with
proliferating nongovernmental
organizations, ODA has been direct
ed to support democratic gover
nance, human rights, and commer
cial and infrastructure development.
The United States Agency for
International Development dedicat
ed an additional $47 million to trade
capacity building in 2003, a 74%
increase over 2002. Three coun
tries—El Salvador, Honduras and
the Dominican Republic—relied
heavily on ODA in 2001 (see Table
2).
Nonetheless, according to the
Inter-American Dialogue Task Force

on Remittances, remittances were
more than twice the amount of
ODA in 2002, amounting “to some
$32 billion dollars—or about 2 per
cent of the regions Gross National
Product and more than triple the
$10 billion they comprised just a
half dozen years ago. ” Remittances
to Mexico jumped to more than $13
billion in 2003. They are even more
important for the smaller, poorer
nation-states in Central America and
the Caribbean, the task force found:

In 2002, remittances accounted fo r
nearly 30 percent o f Nicaragua’s
GDP and 25 percent o f Haiti’s.
They amounted to more than 10
percen t o f GDP in two other
Central American countries—
El Salvador (15 percent) and
Honduras (12 percent)—and in
two Caribbean nations—Guyana
(17 percent) and Jamaica (12 per
cent). In Haiti and Jamaica,
remittances are greater than rev
enues from trade. In three other
countries—El Salvador, Nicaragua,

and the Dominican Republic—
they are more than one-third the
value o f all exports. Mexico, with a
population o f some 100 million,
receives nearly a third o f all remit
tances to Latin America. But El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
and the Dominican Republic, with
a com bined population o f only 33
million, capture more than 40per
cent o f all remittances flow s to the
region.
The source country, of course, can
easily tinker legislatively with remit
tances and use them as a “political
weapon.” It is surely no coincidence
that the countries that capture 40%
of all remittances to Latin America
contributed troops to the occupation
of Iraq. The importance of remit
tances to daily life in many Latin
American countries cannot be over
estimated. Many families have
become dependent on them, and for
the poorest, remittances provide a
continued on page 44
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Widening the War on Terror
by Astrid Arraras and Grace Ivana Deheza

tration argues, are not limited to a
elations between the
particular country or region and
United States and
have a spillover effect that surpasses
Latin America changed
state borders. The security policy
substantially after
of the United States in Latin
September 11, 2001.
America, therefore, focuses on the
During the first months of his
fight against terrorist activities and
administration, George W. Bush
organizations that threaten the
announced that Latin America
security of specific countries, subwould become a central priority of
regions or the hemisphere in gener
US foreign policy. After the 9/11
al.
attacks, however, the locus of Bush’s
foreign policy priorities shifted to
Hemispheric Trouble Spots
the Middle East. W ithin the
Colombia is the centerpiece of
framework of the “war on terror,”
US anti terrorist efforts in Latin
US foreign policy now emphasizes
America. This war-torn country is
combating participants and sup
the third largest recipient of US
porters of fundamentalist Islamic
military aid (after Israel and Egypt).
terrorist organizations. In light of
Colombia is one of the world’s
these developments, some scholars
leading producers and exporters of
and policy makers dismiss Latin
narcotics and is home to three of
America as an Atlantis, or lost con
the 28 groups listed by the US
tinent. But the region is still
State Department as foreign terror
important to the United States, at
ist organizations. Of the three, two
least in terms of security policies.
are left-wing guerrilla organiza
Since 9/11, the United States has
tions—the Revolutionary Armed
extended its “war on terror” to
Forces of Colombia (FARC) and
Latin America. In pursuing this
the National Liberation Army
anti-terrorist crusade, the Bush
(ELN)—and the other is a rightadministration has focused on spe
wing paramilitary coalition, the
cific countries and sub regions
United Self-Defense Groups of
including Colombia, the Mexican
Colombia (AUC). These armed
border, and the Triple Frontier area
factions have been involved in ter
of South America.
rorist activities such as bombings,
After 9/11, the cornerstone of US
murder and abductions, as well as
foreign policy toward Latin
narcotics production and traffick
America became the “war on ter
ing. After 9/11, the Bush adminis
ror.” As part of this campaign, the
tration began viewing any country
Bush administration has redefined
with armed groups as a potential
terrorism as a catch-all concept that
host of terrorism. It also eliminat
includes guerrilla warfare, paramili
ed the distinction between terror
tary activities, narcotics production
and trafficking, illegal migration,
ism and drug production or traf
arms and human trafficking, and
ficking with the insight that terror
ist and narcotics problems are inter
money laundering. These terroristtwined and should be dealt with as
linked activities, the Bush adminis

R
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a whole. The Bush White House
perceives Colombian “narcoterror
ism” as a major national and inter
national security threat with a
potential spillover effect in neigh
boring countries.
In response to the perceived
threat posed by “narcoterrorism,”
the United States made important
changes in its security policy
toward Colombia. From 1999
until 2002, under the so-called
Plan Colombia, the United States
limited its economic assistance to
efforts to crack down on narcotics
production and trafficking. Since
2002, President Bush has sought
and obtained authorization from
the Congress to continue US assis
tance to Colombia in these areas
and to extend it to combating guer
rillas and paramilitary groups. In
2002, the United States gave
Colombia $31 million for police
post support and counter-terrorism
equipment and training. For the
2003 budget, Bush requested and
received approval from Congress to
allocate $93 million for helicopters,
training and other assistance for the
Colombian army to protect the
Cano-Limon Covenas pipeline,
operated by the California-based
Occidental Petroleum Company,
from attacks by terrorist groups. To
further enhance the counter
terrorist capabilities of the
Colombian Armed Forces, Bush
requested $110 million in the 2004
budget. The stated purpose of this
funding is to provide more equip
ment and training to protect the
pipeline and combat narcoterrorism.
Closer to home, the United
States also pays attention to poten
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US security policy toward Latin America since 9/11

A member o f Colombia’s antinarcotics police fo rce on board a US-donated Black Hawk helicopter surveys the operations o f a T65 spray plane used to eradicate opium poppies under cultivation in the mountains ofH uila. The Bush administration has
redefined terrorism as a catch-all concept to include narcotics production and trafficking.
tial terrorist threats from its 1,951mile southern border with Mexico.
Encouraged by Mexican President
Vicente Fox and seeking to gain
support from the Hispanic commu
nity, President Bush made some
steps toward reforming US immi
gration policy toward Mexico dur
ing the first months of his adminis
tration. In the wake of the events

of 9/11, this progress came to a
halt. According to the Bush
administration, a liberal immigra
tion policy with Mexico could serve
as a channel for terrorists, illegal
immigrants, illegal drugs, and arms
and human trafficking, posing a
serious threat to national security.
After 9/11, the US invited
Mexico, as it had Canada previous

ly, to cooperate in the establish
ment of “smart borders.” The goal
was twofold: to facilitate the legal
movement of people and goods
into and out of the United States,
and to protect the United States by
strengthening border security. The
smart borders plan provides for
laser scan identification cards for
frequent border commuters, x-ray
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facilities, shared computer databas
es, and special lanes for pre-inspected shipments. To improve border
security and the development of
smart borders, President Bush pro
posed $10.7 billion for the 2003
budget, an increase of $2.1 billion
from 2002.
Another security concern for the
United States is the area of South
America known as the Triple
Border Area (TBA). The region
where Argentina, Brazil and
Paraguay converge hosts a large
Arab population and State
Department reports describe it as a
hotbed of illegal activity, including
arms and drug trafficking, smug
gling, document and currency
fraud, money laundering, and dis
tribution of pirated goods. More
significant in this case, the State
Department also characterizes the
TBA as a hub for Hezbollah and
Hamas activities, especially financ
ing and logistics. Since the bomb
ings attributed to Hezbollah in
Argentina in 1992 and 1994, US
government officials have become
increasingly concerned about the
presence of Arab radicals in the
TBA.
The 9/11 attacks brought
renewed attention from the United
States and the TBA countries to the
presence of Arab radicals in the
region. During 2002, the TBA
countries cooperated in investigat
ing and disrupting illegal financial
activities linked to Arab terrorist
groups. In December 2002, these
governments invited the United
States to join a counterterrorism
consultative and cooperation mech
anism known as the Three Plus
One (the three TBA countries plus
the United States) to analyze and
combat terrorist threats. A main
issue tackled by the Three Plus One
has been alleged terrorist fundrais
ing on behalf of Hezbollah and
Hamas in the TBA. Since 2001,
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the State Department has been
unable to confirm allegations of the
presence of Osama Bin Laden and
A1 Qaeda support cells in the TBA,
although these leads have been
examined by US and local intelli
gence and law enforcement organi
zations.
In addition to the TBA, the
United States has become con
cerned about potential security
threats in the Caribbean region.
Financial institutions on several
Caribbean islands are known to
benefit from money laundering
operations. Since the 9/11 attacks,
the United States has developed
some security measures along its
“third border” in the Caribbean.
As part of a third border initiative,
the United States aims to establish
security cooperation with
Caribbean nations to address such
problems as arms, drugs and
human trafficking, and money
laundering. In the specific case of
money laundering, the United
States is launching a set of financial
security measures aimed at the
banking system in Latin America,
especially the Caribbean.
Implications for US-Latin
American Relations
The United States’ emphasis on
security challenges and problems in
Latin America has important impli
cations. Under the logic of the war
on terror, the Bush administration
is concentrating efforts and
resources on bilateral relations with
repressive forces in Latin American
countries, including the police and
the armed forces. US support for
these institutions could result in
unpredictable consequences in
Latin America. A 2004 United
Nations Development Programme
survey found that only 43% of
Latin Americans fully supported
democracy in their countries and
that 54.7% would be willing to

consider an authoritarian govern
ment. The empowering of the mil
itary and the police could threaten
recently democratized countries or
even the established democracies of
the region. In addition, the US
emphasis on security policy diverts
sorely needed resources from nontraditional threats, such as poverty,
social exclusion and weak demo
cratic institutions, which also affect
the security of Latin American
countries.
Some recent developments raise
hope for the future of bilateral
security policy as well as the solu
tion of Latin America’s critical
problems. The Organization of
American States’ Special
Conference on Security
Convention has made progress in
including non-traditional threats on
the agenda of hemispheric security.
This conference could become a
new platform to promote multilat
eral cooperation and attention to
critical problems affecting the
region. Without a renewed and
more inclusive perspective on hemi
spheric security, relations between
the United States and Latin
America could become even more
distant and strained. ■

Astrid Arrards is an assistant professor
o f political science at Florida
International University and director
o f academ ic programs fo r the Latin
American an d Caribbean Center.
Grace Ivana Deheza is an adjunct
professor in the University’s School o f
Journalism and Mass
Communication.
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The Remittance Lifeline
by Mariana Martinez
lberto Rodriguez, 29,
arrived in the United
States four years ago
with one goal: to get a
job that would allow
him to support his family He
could not achieve this goal in his
own country, El Salvador, where
unemployment rates are high due
to a precarious economy.
Every morning, Alberto gets up
at 5:45 and walks to the corner of
Shallowford Road and Bufford
Highway in Atlanta, Georgia,
where he often waits several hours
to be picked up for short-term jobs.
Once a week, he walks three miles
to a remittances center to send his
savings to his wife, Isaura, who
stayed behind in El Salvador with
their four children. He sends
almost all of his wages to feed and
educate them. These remittances
have been their lifeline and have
allowed Isaura to start a small street
business selling pupusas (a type of
stuffed tortilla) in front of a factory.
She has also been able to begin
work on the initial stages of a small
brick house in Soyapango, a neigh
borhood of San Salvador. The
whole family dreams of the day
Alberto will return home, but they
know that it will take a long time
for their dream to come true.
Alberto’s story is typical of mil
lions of his countrymen. More
than two million Salvadorans have
left their homeland to enter the
United States, legally or illegally, in
search of jobs that will allow them
to send money to their families.
The phenomenon appears to be
unstoppable in El Salvador, where
remittances reached a record high

A

Money sentfrom abroad helps
Salvadoran families survive but
hasnt changed the roots of poverty
of $2.1 billion in 2003 and contin
ued to increase in the first months
of 2004. According to the Central
Bank of El Salvador, the volume of
remittances jumped 20.4% in the
first quarter of the current year.
Remittances already represent
67.1% of the total value of net
exports from this small Central
American country and 14.03% of
total 2003 GDP.
We know why Salvadorans decide
to migrate and why they are send
ing money to their families, but
several other important questions
about remittances remain to be
answered: How is the money being
used? And, more important, are
remittances improving living stan
dards and playing a fundamental
role in the economic development
of the country?
In March 2004, I conducted a
survey in San Salvador to try to
answer these questions. The survey
included 429 subjects selected from
a socioeconomic cross-section of
the metropolitan area of San
Salvador, which has 1.2 million
inhabitants. The people inter
viewed were adults (18 years and
older) who received remittances
from relatives in the United States.
The survey was supplemented by
an in-depth interview with a
Salvadoran family and a focus

group of 15 individuals from differ
ent sectors of the capital’s popula
tion.
The study found that, on aver
age, Salvadorans receive about $200
per month from relatives living
abroad. They use this money fun
damentally to cover their basic
needs (food and living expenses).
The extra dollars have helped
increase family incomes in El
Salvador, where the minimum wage
is 42 colones ($4.80) per day. But
while remittances help alleviate the
relative poverty in which people
live, they do not eliminate it or cre
ate better living conditions for
Salvadorans. Remittances have cre
ated an “artificial” economy that is
based not on productivity but on
external elements.
The Household Impact of
Remittances
More than 70% of respondents
to the March survey said they
received remittances once a month.
Another 21.21% received them
twice a month, and 5.36% received
remittances more than three times
per month. The data show that
remittances are not being used in
the productive cycle of the
Salvadoran economy, but rather are
needed to cover immediate house
hold expenses. When the recipients
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were asked how they used the
money they received, slightly more
than half (50.8%) said they spent
the money mostly on food.
Another 18.2% reported using it
for education, 10.5% for health
expenses, and 8.4% to pay rent.
Only 4.2% used the money prima
rily to operate or open a small busi
ness, and just 1.6% said they put it
into savings. A larger percentage of
respondents used at least some por
tion of remittances for long-term
goals once basic needs were cov
ered. More than 50% of the recipi
ents declared that they used part of
the money to study, while 16.3%
said they applied it to start their
own small businesses (81.8% trade,
16.7% services, and 3.03% agricul
ture).
Most of those who receive remit
tances are women (64.4%), and
those who send them are mostly
men. People 30 years old or under
are most likely to receive money
from their relatives abroad. The
likelihood of receiving money
decreases after 30 and increases
once again among recipients who
are 50 or older. This reflects the
fact that young women tend to
remain in El Salvador in charge of
the family unit while their hus
bands migrate to the US to earn
better incomes. Respect for familial
bonds makes it unnecessary to
establish any method of control for
the use of the money beyond a ver
bal agreement.
People 50 and older use remit
tances mostly for medicine and
health care, while those between
the ages of 20 and 30 rely on them
to pay for education. An end to
remittances, therefore, would jeop
ardize the daily survival of many
families. Sustenance and education
would be hardest hit, with savings
and health care significantly affect
ed.
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Implications for the National
Economy
In the last 20 years, the
Salvadoran economy has grown
increasingly reliant on the flow of
foreign remittances. The continu
ous flow of dollars into the country
was one factor behind the govern
ment’s decision to adopt a policy of
dollarization and has created a
strong dependency on the US econ
omy. As a result, the country is
extremely vulnerable to external
shocks. Without the development
of savings and investment, the
economy will need ever greater
daily flows of dollars to survive, cre
ating a vicious cycle that only
increases El Salvador’s dependence
on the amount of remittances its
citizens receive.
The families interviewed
described remittances as an element
of economic survival rather than as
extra income that would allow
them to improve their economic
status. They reported using most
of the money to purchase consumer
goods, not to invest or save. This
trend underscores the necessity of
creating a culture of savings among
Salvadorans and introducing the
resources from remittances into the
productive cycle of the economy to
generate sustainable economic
growth. This will be extremely dif
ficult as long as the recipients of
remittances belong to the poorest
sectors of the population.
It is vital for El Salvador to estab
lish economic mechanisms that can
generate sustainable growth. The
March survey suggests one poten
tial avenue to help change the “arti
ficial” structure of the economy
into one based on the development
of internal forces. The survey and
focus groups reveal that most
Salvadorans would explore the pos
sibility of opening their own small
businesses if they had the resources
to do so, if the national economy

improved, or if they had the neces
sary training. The study found that
76.2% of those interviewed who do
not own their own business would
be “interested” in opening one, as
opposed to 23.8% who answered
they were “not interested at all.”
The reasons for not starting a busi
ness included lack of savings
(19.35%) or the state of the nation
al economy (17.2%).
At the same time, the study
found that Salvadorans, unlike
most other Latin Americans, are
comfortable using the banking sys
tem. In El Salvador it is not
unusual to see a peasant walk into a
bank to withdraw money from an
account or an ATM machine. In
fact, most of the interviewees said
that they receive remittances
through the banking system
(60.6%). This is an indication of
the strength of El Salvador’s bank
ing culture and of a good environ
ment for establishing micro-loans.
Based on these findings, the
study recommends that the
Salvadoran government and non
governmental organizations
(NGOs) create support plans for
the recipients of remittances by
establishing small investment proj
ects (urban and rural) to channel
resources received from abroad in a
productive manner. This ambitious
goal can only be reached through
development of a culture of savings
(via public relations campaigns,
educational programs, etc.) and
establishment of micro-loans as a
fundamental tool in the country’s
economy
How could the government do
this? One important factor would
be to persuade financial institutions
to change their lending policies for
applicants requesting micro-loans.
Instead of requiring the usual col
lateral, the banks should put their
trust in the labor force, in the rev
enues that would be generated from
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the initial investment of capital,
and the remittances Salvadorans
like Isaura receive from abroad on a
regular basis. Once Salvadorans
can open a small business they
could use remittances to improve it
or put the money into savings,
while using the revenues generated
by the small business to support
their families and pay back the
micro-loans.
The rising total of remittances is
not simply a result of migration,
but also one of its causes. Among
the main reasons Salvadorans cite
for leaving their homes are vio
lence, public insecurity, unemploy
ment, and the desire to help rela
tives by sending money from
abroad. When remittances become
essential for the survival of a large
percentage of the population, as is
the case in El Salvador, it is only
logical to expect people to continue
to look for income sources outside
the country in the following years.
Only if remittances enter the pro
ductive economic cycle, allowing
the economy of El Salvador to
change from an artificial structure
to a productive one that is sustain
able in the long run, will Alberto
and other Salvadoran migrants be
able to fulfill their dream of coming
home. ■

M anana Martinez is writing her
thesis on remittances fo r the Master o f
Arts in Latin American and
Caribbean Studies at Florida
International University. She works
as an econom ic analyst fo r the BBC.

CUBAN RESEARCH INSTITUTE
6th Conference on Cuban and Cuban-American Studies
“Politics and Culture”
October 27-29, 2005 • Florida International University

CALL FOR PAPERS AND PANELS
The Cuban Research Institute continues the tradition of convening schol
ars engaged in the study of Cuba and Cuban-Americans by announcing its
6th Conference. We encourage the submission of panels and papers in all
areas of intellectual inquiry relevant to the history, economics, politics, cul
ture, society, and creative expression of Cuba and its diaspora. The overar
ching theme of the 6th Conference is “Politics and Culture.” All proposals
for individual papers will be considered, although we prefer proposals for
full panels.

G uidelin es f o r p r ese n tin g p a n els a n d p a p ers
Panels should include four paper presentations, a chair (who may be one of
the presenters) and a discussant. Panels may include up to but no more
than five paper presentations if they do not include a discussant.
Participants may perform two roles at the conference (chair, discussant,
roundtable participant, paper presenter) but may not present more than one
paper. Submissions may be in English or Spanish.
Proposals for panels or roundtables must include a general description of the
theme and one-page abstracts of each participant’s paper. The following
information must be submitted for each participant: full name, academic
affiliation, preferred addresses, office and home phone numbers, fax, and email address. Persons wishing to submit individual papers must present a
one-page abstract and all pertinent personal data.
As in previous years, the CRI will offer a limited number of partial travel
grants to graduate students and junior scholars. Applicants should indicate
their interest in and need for such support.
Deadline for submission of all paper and panel proposals is January 15,
2005. Notifications of acceptance (and regrets) will be mailed by April 15,
2005.
For further information about the conference and other CRI activities,
please see our website at http://lacc.fiu.edu/cri/ or
contactDamian
Fernandez, Director (Damian.Fernandez@fiu.edu) or
Uva
deAragon,
Associate Director (Uva.De_Aragon@fiu.edu).

CUBAN RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Florida International University
DM 363, University Park, Miami, FL 33199
(305) 348-1991/Fax (305) 348-3593
crinst@fiu.edu
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Binational Cooperation
by Dennis J. Bixler-Marquez

negative potential of new security
he political and busi
policies and wait for a more auspi
ness leaders of
cious time to renew the bilateral
transnational commu
dialogue on border-relevant issues,
nities on international
the leadership of the US-Mexico
borders have learned
border region recognized that the
to examine the dictates of their
events of 9/11 had placed the bor
political centers through a prism
der high on the political agenda and
that gauges the impact on their
organized for political action. The
regions of national and global inter
challenge to transnational commu
ests. The primary challenge for
nities and other less integrated bor
such communities is informing and
der areas changed from attracting
affecting national policy to their
the attention of their political cen
benefit, including minimizing the
ters to leveraging their newly gained
unavoidable negative impact of
prominence. A further challenge
commercial or political disloca
became how to mesh US security
tions.
interests with the local and global
Historically, the biggest political
economic agendas. In a climate of
issue that has confronted commu
post-9/11 hysteria, the political and
nities on the US-Mexico border is
business leadership of transnational
finding a place on the political and
communities such as El Paso,
fiscal agendas of their respective
Texas/Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua
nations and, in some cases, their
recognized the need to transform
states. Since September 11, 2001,
the region’s image in the eyes of the
however, national security measures
US public and government.
have drastically modified the man
Specifically, they sought to change
agement of the flow of people and
the perception that an improved
commerce at border crossings and
flow of people and commerce into
ports of entry. Washington, D.C.
the US automatically translates into
and Mexico City have moved bor
lax
national security and a danger
der management to the forefront of
ous
southern border. Global corpo
their bilateral relations, shifting
rations
and trade organizations con
away from their earlier unilateral
cerned
about
the new security meas
ism in policy formulation and
ures
coalesced
with political groups
application. Current globalization
such
as
the
US
congressional border
trends, such as the flight of
and
Hispanic
caucuses
and the USmaquiladoras from Mexico to
Mexico
border
governors
to lobby
China, the increase of undocu
federal
entities
to
improve
border
mented immigration to the US,
management.
The
Mexican
govern
and the implementation of new
ment also realized the political and
security measures have prompted
economic benefits of playing an
concerted political action by enti
active role in the protection of the
ties on the US-Mexico border and
United States’ southern perimeter
responses from federal entities in
and became a strategic stakeholder
both nations.
Rather than decry the obvious
in American security.

T
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The US-Mexico Border after 9/11
The events of 9/11 and the subse
quent war with Iraq affected the
political and economic relations of
the United States and Mexico along
their common 2,000-mile border.
US Homeland Security legislation
and previous stopgap measures
played an important role in this
binational relation. As J. M.
Heyman (2001) points out, interna
tional crossings typically absorb the
impact of the official national policy
of the moment, particularly in
administrative sectors. But while
administrative problems that
impinged on binational commerce
and economic development in the
border region intensified after 9/11,
other problems were gradually allevi
ated during this unstable period as
regionally crafted political strategies
brought long-sought federal atten
tion to the southern US border.
This analysis focuses on binational
commerce and transportation on the
US-Mexican border, using examples
and statistics mostly from, but not
limited to, the metropolitan area that
includes El Paso, Ciudad Juarez and
small communities in southern New
Mexico that border the states of
Texas and Chihuahua. Binational
commerce and transportation were
selected due to their importance to
the maquiladora industry in Mexico
and border metropolitan areas, par
ticularly in the context of the North
American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA). US national security pol
icy and legislation, as well as the sub
sequent administrative measures
applied on the border, are examined
in light of globalization patterns
manifesting themselves in the region.
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Homeland security and the politics of
transportation and commerce
Also included is a conceptualization
of how binational and regional inte
gration measures can be crafted
politically under the umbrella of pro
posed federal expenditures and secu
rity regulations in the region.
Commerce and Transportation
Before 9/11, commercial relations
between the United States and
Mexico were strained regarding such
issues as non-competitive Mexican
agricultural products, binational
commercial transportation under
NAFTA, water rights pertaining to
the Colorado and Rio Grande rivers,
and the perennial immigration
debate. The sluggish US economy
also had a negative impact on the
border region, particularly the
maquiladora industry. Trade
between Mexico and the US
declined, complicating negotiations
in controversial areas such as tariffs
and farm subsidies.
On 9/11, border crossing points
were closed and US federal authori
ties began to implement stricter secu
rity measures that emulated
Operation Intercept, the 1969 pro
gram that was the most intensive
federal interdiction effort until that
time. A Nixon administration strate
gy to pressure Mexico economically
to play a proactive role in the war
against drugs, Operation Intercept
called for all vehicles entering the
United States to be inspected. The
documents of travelers, particularly
pedestrians, were scrutinized careful
ly. When these measures were rein
troduced in fall 2001, the time it
took to cross into the United States
went from an average of 45 minutes
to an average of two to three hours.

Pedestrian, vehicular and commercial
flows were reduced to an alarming
level, affecting the regional economy
immediately. The products of
assembly plants owned by US and
other foreign companies began to
pile up on the Mexican side. Retail
and wholesale sales on both sides of
the border were affected as border
dwellers delayed social visits and
shopping trips to avoid long lines
and possible mistreatment by
American authorities. Long crossing
times became the norm again after
the start of the war with Iraq in
2003 but soon abated significantly
due to infrastructure improvements
and an increase in US Customs per
sonnel.
Mexican authorities also increased
their vigilance, but to a level and in a
manner that did not significantly
affect commerce or the binational
flow of the border population. After
the start of the war with Iraq, the
Mexican army deployed some of its
units to urban and rural border
crossings. Mexican immigration
officials increased their scrutiny of
visitors entering Mexico from Islamic
countries and of travelers bound to
the US. The Iraq war prompted
Mexico to launch Operation
Sentinel, a program designed to pro
tect its northern and southern bor
ders, other points of entry such as
seaports and airports, tourist sites
and critical infrastructure.
This increased monitoring had
some objective consequences for the
regional economy and public percep
tion of the border. Even though the
war on drugs took a back seat to
national security concerns, contra
band to the US diminished and

interdiction of narcotics and illicit
merchandise increased dramatically
in 2002. Fugitives from American
justice who had crossed back and
forth over the border with impunity
were captured routinely in 2002 and
2003. But drug traffickers sought
alternate routes into the US and the
smuggling of human cargo increased,
as well as its cost in terms of dollars
and lives lost.
The positive results of increased
monitoring and interdiction did not
go unnoticed in the United States,
where the American public asked,
why wasn’t the border policed this
way previously? On both sides of
the border, political and civic leaders,
chambers of commerce and interna
tional transportation associations
began to lobby US federal authorities
for agents and equipment to create a
more efficient inspection system.
They warned of a catastrophic deteri
oration of the border economy if an
enhanced inspection system and
ancillary improvements failed to
materialize. On the US side, the
lobbying was led by local spokesper
sons emphasizing patriotism and rec
ognizing the necessity to maintain a
state of vigilance for the sake of
national security.
Initial Security Measures to
Monitor Trade and Transportation
Renewed federal attention to the
border region brought some early
positive results in the form of infra
structure development. The national
security program authorized by
Congress in 2002 assigned sophisti
cated equipment for the inspection
of commercial vehicles, trailers and
containers. Homeland security legis

Hemisphere Volume 14

Features: The US-Mexican Border

Administrative binational cooperation on the
border is politically feasible, even under diffi
cult political circumstances. If US national
security policy is properly incorporated into
requests and dialogue on regional require
ments, smart borders are possible.
lation authorized the development
and implementation of an electronic
registration system for passports,
visas and other documents, as well as
the tracking of all who enter and
leave the country legally by 2005.
This tracking system incorporates
biometric technology that enables
the recognition of body features,
allowing closer inspection of human
traffic across the border. In 2003
most visitors and immigrants were
still registered only when entering
the country. The new outflow
inspection will likely cause delays in
the tourist and commercial flow
from the US to Mexico until effec
tive logistics for its implementation
are in place.
Ironically, many border interests,
as well as federal agencies directly
concerned with border security, had
clamored for improvements of the
immigration, customs and law
enforcement infrastructure on the
border for decades before 9/11, with
few results. It was not until the
region’s leadership articulated a new
marketing strategy—labeling the
requests as integral components of
the new national security policy and,
to a lesser degree, a stimulus to
regional commerce—that the federal
authorities acceded. The same pat
tern is true of pre-9/11 requests for
the electronic visa readers held by
many visitors. The Immigration and
Naturalization Service did not
receive this equipment until after
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9/11, when its use was deemed vital
to national security.
Binational Relations and Regional
Integration in an Era of
Heightened National Security
On March 22, 2002, Presidents
Bush and Fox signed the US-Mexico
Border Partnership Agreement in
Monterrey, Mexico. The so-called
“Smart Border Plan” aims to imple
ment a modern inspection infra
structure to facilitate an efficient flow
of people and commercial traffic.
Some of its provisions, such as
advanced inspection of US-bound
cargo and the establishment of new
vehicular express lanes at crossing
points for travelers categorized as a
low security risk, were implemented
gradually in 2003. It shows that
administrative binational cooperation
on the border is politically feasible,
even under difficult political circum
stances. If US national security poli
cy is properly incorporated into
requests and dialogue on regional
requirements, an “intelligent and
dynamic border,” in the words of
Mexico’s Consul General in San
Antonio, Carlos Vidali, is a viable
outcome.
Although the US and Mexico are
far from resolving such difficult
issues as amnesty for undocumented
Mexican immigrants or Mexican
support in the United Nations for
US Middle East policy, progress is
certainly possible in other areas. The

political costs of Mexico’s unwilling
ness to support the US during the
UN deliberations on Iraq remain
unclear, despite Colin Powell’s
protestations that the US still views
Mexico as a friend. Diplomatic
efforts have overcome other scandals
in the past. Recently, despite the dis
covery by the Mexican press that the
American company Choice Point
fraudulently obtained Mexico’s voter
registration lists on behalf of US
intelligence agencies, Homeland
Security Secretary Tom Ridge met
with Mexico’s Secretary of the
Interior, Santiago Creel, to discuss an
undocumented immigrant amnesty
and border regional security. Mexico
has attempted to leverage its support
for US national security in the bor
der region by including the issue of
amnesty for undocumented immi
grants in the US. In turn, the US
Congress has tried to link an
amnesty to the privatization of
Mexican oil. As these back and forth
negotiations indicate, it is possible to
reach agreements in some areas and
to continue, defer or even develop
new lines of dialogue in others.
Such a pragmatic approach is consis
tent with the two nations’ recent
diplomatic history.
Homeland Security, Borders and
Emerging Globalization Trends
In an era of increased national
security, the binational communities
along the US-Mexico border must
incorporate their needs and aspira
tions into the extant rules of federal
financial sponsorship, policies and
regulations applicable to the region.
Nestor Rodriguez and Jacqueline
Hogan (2001) find that border
regions such as El Paso/Ciudad
Juarez and Laredo/Nuevo Laredo
have a successful track record as
transborder communities despite the
national regulations that divide
them. This strategy is increasingly
the most viable avenue for adapting
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to the global imperatives of the new
millennium.
Binational cooperation and region
al integration are key mechanisms for
addressing border issues and reduc
ing the burden of administrative pro
cedures designed to fortify national
security. Officials representing bor
der areas in both countries encourage
such a strategy. Jeffrey Jones, a
Mexican federal senator from a
region of Chihuahua adjacent to the
US border, argued eloquently in
2002 in favor of region-based plan
ning: “The relationship between
Mexico and the US first occurs on
the border. The border region must
develop and propose solutions and
initiatives based on its binational
conceptualization.” New Mexico
Governor Bill Richardson has pro

posed that his state, Chihuahua and
West Texas promote a synergetic
regional agenda to better leverage
economic development and trade,
and San Antonio’s Consul Vidali
calls for systemic dialogue on the
border and its problems in the bina
tional organizations directly con
cerned with them, such as the
International Water and Boundary
Commission. Scholars too recom
mend integrated planning for the
development of transborder values
and epistemologies unique to specific
border sectors. Luis Ernesto Derbez,
Mexico’s foreign relations secretary,
predicts that solutions to immigra
tion and other areas of mutual con
cern may come in small increments
depending on political and economic
conditions, such as the winding

COMING

down of the war with Iraq and
reduced national security alert levels.
Last year, the inhabitants of the
border listened with optimism, and
some reserve, to Tom Ridge as he
promised representatives of the
National Association of Counties
that his department will safeguard
the nation’s borders using methods,
infrastructure and technology that
ensure the safe and fluid movement
of commerce and people.
Significantly, Ridge delivered this
message at a meeting of local polities,
the first to absorb the impact of fed
eral policy. ■

Dennis J. Bixler-Mdrquez is director o f
the Chicano Studies Program at the
University o f Texas at El Paso.

SOON

FIU Report on “Terrorism Preparedness in Florida”
Dr. Michael W. Collier, Lead Investigator
This two-year field research project by Florida International University’s Latin American and Caribbean Center
and Institute for the Study of Transnational Crime and Terrorism investigates the readiness of Florida’s first
responders to handle a terrorist attack. Included are an assessment of the security posture of Florida’s critical
infrastructure and a statewide telephone poll of Florida citizens about terrorism preparedness issues.
While Florida is often seen as a national leader in emergency readiness programs and is better prepared than
before the 9/11 disasters, the state is far from ready to respond to future attacks. The citizens surveyed for this
project strongly supported terrorism preparedness programs, indicating they would give up more civil liberties
and pay higher taxes to ensure the safety of their families.
To order an advance copy, call the Latin American and Caribbean Center at Florida International University,
(305) 348-2894, or email Michael Collier at: collierm@fiu.edu.
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Dream or Deja Vu?
by Charles D. Thompson, Jr. and Benjamin Grob-Fitzgibbon
hen President
George W. Bush
announced his
plans for immi
gration reform
on January 7, 2004, he immediately
ran into opposition. The president
called for a vast guest worker pro
gram that would legalize hundreds
of thousands of immigrants, chiefly
Mexican farm workers. Guest
workers would be given three-year,
renewable contracts with American
employers and granted safe and
legal passage between their homes
and the United States; however, the
program would withhold ordinary
work visas, provide no path to per
manent residency or citizenship,
and allow undocumented workers
in the United States to participate
only after they paid a fine.
Criticism came without delay.
Conservatives were skeptical of any
immigration program that would
give rights to and legitimate the
past behavior of undocumented
workers. Tom DeLay, the
Republican House Majority leader,
expressed “heartfelt reservations”
about a proposal that “seems to
reward illegal behavior.”
Progressives criticized the proposed
program for failing to go far
enough, for focusing on US eco
nomic and security needs over the
rights and welfare of the guest
workers themselves. The
Farmworker Justice Fund pro
claimed that the president was
“essentially proposing a new era of
indentured servants,” adding that
the US had “experimented with
indentured servitude and ‘guestworker’ programs [before]; they
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“As a nation that

values immigration, and

depends on immigration, we should have immigration
laws that work and make us proud. Yet today we do
not. Instead, we see many employers turning to the

illegal labor market .

We see millions of

hard-working men and women condemned to fear and
insecurity in a massive,

economy.

undocumented

Illegal entry across our borders makes

more difficult the urgent task of securing the home
land. The system is not working. Our nation needs an
immigration system that serves the American economy,

andreflects the American Dream.”
President George W. Bush
January 7, 2004
“George Bush’s plan leaves foreign workers as

fodder for our fields and factories
without giving them a path to legalization and
a fair shot at the American Dream.”
Senator Joseph Lieberman, D -Connecticut
January 7, 2004

Photo Essay: Immigrant Workers

The debate surrounding George W. Bush’s
proposed immigration reform
failed miserably and caused great
m isery” Even Mexican President
Vicente Fox expressed some doubt
about the program’s ability to gain
congressional approval before the
next election. It became apparent
at once that Bush would face an
uphill battle in making any head
way with his immigration plan.
Fifty Years of US Guest Worker
Programs
The president’s proposal was not
a new initiative, as he implied. In
fact, the United States has been
experimenting with guest worker
programs for more than half a cen
tury The Bracero Program of 1942
was intended to provide replace
ment workers for World War II sol
diers and continued until 1964,
bringing nearly five million
Mexicans to the US for temporary
farm work. The H-2 Program
began in 1952, mainly to supply
sugarcane workers. In 1986, as part
of President Reagan’s Immigration
Reform and Control Act (IRCA),
the program was split into H-2A
and H-2B, the former concerned
with farm workers and the latter
with industrial labor.
Throughout the past decade,
there have been various efforts to
reform or even abolish existing
guest worker programs. Only
months before Bush’s proposal, in
fall 2003, legislators introduced a
new bill called the Agricultural Job
Opportunity, Benefits, and Security
Act, commonly known as
“AgJOBS.” This bipartisan bill,
resulting from long negotiations
between labor unions, farm organi
zations and farm worker advocacy
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groups, had already been co-spon
sored by 88 representatives and 50
senators when Bush announced his
own proposal. AgJOBS contains
two parts. The first, a two-step
“earned adjustment” program,
would allow undocumented farm
workers who had been performing
agricultural work in the United
States to gain temporary resident
immigrant status and, after com
pleting a further three to six years of
work, permanent resident status.
The second part of the bill calls for
the current H-2A program to be
revised substantially, granting more
rights and better working condi
tions to immigrants.
The contrast between AgJOBS
and the president’s proposal is strik
ing. The former envisions progres
sive steps that could lead to US citi
zenship. The president’s proposal
offers no such long-term initiatives.
The reforms contained within
AgJOBS are concerned primarily
with farm workers’ rights, such as
guaranteed work, fair wages and
travel compensation. Bush’s pro
gram emphasizes homeland security
and the US economy.
At this writing, it is unclear if
either of these programs will be
adopted, or what the future holds
for guest workers who come to the
United States. What is clear, how
ever, is the need to study existing
guest worker programs before we
adopt any further expansion plans.
Only by interviewing and docu
menting the lives of the workers
themselves will it be possible to
arrive at a just and democratic labor
and immigration policy. Before
proceeding further with immigra
tion reform, we must know how
guest workers are treated in the
transition between their country of
origin and the United States, what
rights they have while they are here,
and what communication, if any,
they have with their own govern
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ments when they are away from
home.
One way to find answers to these
questions is to study existing guest
worker programs. The largest of
these is the H-2A Program men
tioned above. The southeastern
American states, especially North
Carolina, lead the nation in hosting
H-2A workers and are a natural
starting point for such an examina
tion. North Carolina receives the
largest number of H-2A workers
annually, currently about 24% of
those in the program. These labor
ers harvest a variety of crops,

including Christmas trees, cucum
bers, sweet peppers and other veg
etables, but the crop most responsi
ble for the heavy influx of guest
workers is tobacco. In 2001,
14,600 H-2A employees were work
ing in southeastern tobacco fields,
7,800 of them in North Carolina.
In the South, tobacco has long
been a cash crop farmed with the
help of landless labor—slaves at first
and then, following abolition,
sharecroppers, although the region
was also home to thousands of
small family tobacco farms. With
time, as small farmers lost their
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The North Carolina Growers
Association contracts with the
Chihuahua Bus Company to trans
p ort H-2A workers. North Carolina
receives the most H-2A workers o f
any state in the country.

H2-A workers at Wester Farms in
Louisburg, North Carolina carry
computer chips that record the num
ber o f buckets they pick. Here, a
worker has his latest bucket recorded.
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tobacco acreage to large farms and
the domestic labor force sought bet
ter paying jobs, another source of
workers was needed. With the US
government’s support, southern
tobacco farmers began to recruit
Mexican workers. But these
migrant laborers moved from farm
to farm throughout the growing
season and farmers deemed them
unreliable. The search for a reliable
labor pool prompted North
Carolina tobacco interests to pursue
a guaranteed labor supply through
H-2A.
Much of North Carolina’s success
in attracting H-2A workers is due
to the North Carolina Growers’
Association (NCGA), an organiza
tion started in 1989 with the sole
purpose of matching H-2A workers
with North Carolina farmers. To
begin with, the NCGA had only 40
farmer members who together
employed 350 workers. By 1998, it
had grown to 800 members and
7,000 workers. By 2003, the num
ber of H-2A workers had climbed
to 12,000. Farmers favor H-2A
workers because of their reliabili
ty—they are bused from Mexico to
individual farms where they remain
for the entire season. Also, farmers
pay no Social Security or other taxes
on H-2A wages. By far the greatest
advantage of the H-2A workers,
however, is the farmer’s ability to
control the flow of labor in and out
of the farm.
In his January 2004 speech,
President Bush insisted that any
immigration reform must reflect the
American Dream. Yet with the
notable exception of bringing
undocumented workers into the
program, his proposal differs little
from the present H-2A system.
This raises an important question
that only further fieldwork can
answer: Does the H-2A program
reflect the American Dream, or is it
merely a continuation of the same
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H-2A workers on their way to North
Carolina at a lunch stop in Houston,
Texas.

The trip to the United States costs
some H-2A workers as much as
$1500 o f their own money fo r trans
portation an d fees collected by
Mexican “coyotes. ”
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Picking cucumbers. H-2A workers are bused to individual farm s where they remain fo r the entire season.
policies the US has followed for
more than 50 years?
Strengths and Weaknesses of
Guest Worker Programs
To seek an answer to this ques
tion, among others, Cynthia Hill
and Charles D. Thompson, Jr. (co
author of this article) have pro
duced a documentary film entitled
“The Guestworker: Bienvenidos a
Carolina del Norte (Welcome to
North Carolina).” For this project,
they followed H-2A workers from
their arrival on a North Carolina
farm in June 2002 to their return
home to Mexico in November of
the same year and continued docu
menting them the following year.
Hill and Thompson focused on a

single household of workers, on one
particular farm, as representative of
the larger contingent of H-2A
workers in the United States. The
film is narrated by one of the work
ers, Candelario Gonzalez Moreno.
“The Guestworker” allows H-2A
workers to speak for themselves and
shows the reality of life on one
North Carolina farm. It documents
all aspects of the H-2A worker’s life,
from grocery shopping and cooking
to the long days spent in the fields.
Many of the workers are grateful for
the safety of the H-2A program,
particularly the older workers who
can no longer risk the arduous path
of illegal border crossings. Most are
glad to have a written work contract
to protect them.

The H-2A program also has nega
tive aspects, however. In interviews,
dozens of the H-2A workers in Hill
and Thompson’s film longed for
rights that are currently denied
them. These include greater job
security and the freedom to live
with their families year-round in the
United States. H-2A provides no
retirement or Social Security bene
fits, and without any hope of citi
zenship, rights to collective bargain
ing are curtailed. Much of the
enforcement of contracts is left up
to the NCGA, a private organiza
tion essentially owned by farmer
members.
Workers are also fearful of what
they call the “lista negra ,” or black
list. This is a list controlled by
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growers that contains the names of
workers eligible for continued
employment in future years. If a
worker leaves before the end of the
growing season, even because of ill
ness, he is forbidden to return for
three years. After the three years are
up, he is placed at the bottom of
the list, making it unlikely that he
will get a return spot.
There are further downsides to
the H-2A program. The trip to the
United States costs some H-2A
workers as much as $1,500 of their
own funds for transportation and
fees collected by Mexican
“recruiters,” otherwise known as
“coyotes.” While employers reim
burse much of this fronted money
by the end of the season in
November, before that time workers
often pay exorbitant interest rates
on borrowed funds. This debt
effectively keeps them on the farms,
even if the work is not to their lik
ing or they are abused.
Compare these conditions with
those described by President Bush
in his description of the American
Dream for immigrants. He speaks
of a “welcoming society” that has
encouraged the “hard work and the
faith and the entrepreneurial spirit
of immigrants” to flourish. Current
guest worker programs, the presi
dent claims, have allowed “the tal
ents and dreams of the world” to be
used to benefit the United States.
Many immigrants, he says, staying
true to the American Dream, have
taken the “familiar path from hired
labor to ownership.” Are such con
cepts compatible with the current
structure of the H-2A program?
Existing fieldwork suggests they are
not, although much work remains
to be done before we can reach a
firm conclusion. What can be said
with certainty, though, is that for
any new guest worker proposal to
bring immigrants closer to the
American Dream, the current sys-
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Mexican H-2A workers making the jou rn ey to North Carolina study a map to
fam iliarize themselves with their destination.
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H-2A workers waiting outside NCGA
headquarters in Vass, North Carolina.
tern o f im m igration m ust be care
fully studied and the mistakes o f the
past m ust be avoided. ■

Charles D. Thompson, Jr. is educa
tion and curriculum director o f the
Center fo r Documentary Studies and
an adjunct professor o f cultural
anthropology at Duke University. He
is co-editor, with M elinda F. Wiggins,
o f “The Human Cost o f Food:
Farmworkers’ Lives, Labor, and
Advocacy” (Austin: University o f
Texas Press, 2002) and co-director,
with Cynthia Hill, o f the film “The
Guestworker: Bienvenidos a Carolina
d el Norte. ” Benjamin GrobFitzgibbon is a PhD candidate in his
tory at Duke University. He has pu b 
lished articles in “The Historian, ”
“Terrorism an d Political Violence, ”
and “Peace and Change. ”
The authors w ould like to acknowl
edge and thank Anna Bauer, Carey
Dawn Lowe and Caitlin Beer fo r
their invaluable research assistance.

Candelario Gonzdlez Moreno, a Mexican H-2A worker and the subject o f a doc
umentary film on guest workers in North Carolina.
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Is Mexico Too Difficult to Bear?
by Juan Carlos Gamboa
The U.S. and Mexico: The Bear
and the Porcupine
By Jeffrey Davidow
Princeton, N.J.: Markus Wiener
Publishers, 2003, 254 pages.
$69.95 hardcover; $24.95 paper
back.
Easy to read and packed with
delightful anecdotes, The Bear and
the Porcupine is an informal mem
oir of Jeffrey Davidow’s four-year
tenure (1998-2002) as US ambassa
dor to Mexico. The book features
his recollections of some of the
most important political events in
Mexico’s recent history: the election
of Vicente Fox as president and the
consolidation of the country’s dem
ocratic transition after more than
70 years of semi-authoritarian rule
under the Institutional
Revolutionary Party (PRI).
The book’s title refers to the his
torical relationship between the
sometimes admiring and always
prickly Mexican “porcupine” and
the usually well-intended but often
insensitive American “bear.”
Davidow offers readers a first-hand
account of the many misunder
standings that make it difficult to
achieve improved cooperation
between the two countries.
The analysis is spiced with a
healthy dose of gossip about influ
ential Mexican and US political
personalities. On the Mexican side,
former Foreign Minister Jorge
Castaneda comes off as impulsive
and undisciplined, while on the US
side, Ari Fleischer and Madelaine
Albright are portrayed as an arro
gant brat and a prima donna,
respectively.
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But nothing seems to amuse
Davidow more than the maneuvers
of Mexican politicians during an
electoral season. “I enjoy the com
pany of politicians in campaign,”
he writes. “Like dogs in heat, there
is a simplicity and transparency to
their objectives. Observing
Mexican politicians is doubly fun
because they truly enjoy backstabbing and gossiping, two of the
world’s great spectator sports.”
Also enjoyable are Davidow’s
anecdotes about visitors to the
Mexican Embassy from “Planet
Washington.” In his view, unin
formed and pushy American offi
cials don’t mix well with oversensi
tive Mexicans who seem convinced
that the White House spends much
of its time plotting ways to under
mine Mexico’s sovereignty.
Davidow illustrates such sensitivi
ties with anecdotes of his daily
interactions with members of the
Mexican press, whose questions
were invariably variations on the
theme, “How are you planning to
violate our sovereignty today, Mr.
Ambassador?”
But The Bear and the Porcupine is
much more than political gossip
and entertainment. It provides
readers with a keen analysis of some
of the issues that have defined the
nature of US-Mexico bilateral rela
tions in the past few years. Among
the book’s many contributions is
Davidow’s fascinating insider
account of the failed attempt by
President Fox to reach a compre
hensive agreement on immigration
with the United States. In the
ambassador’s view, Fox’s failure had
less to do with the change in
American priorities after September
11 than with Mexico’s pushiness
and misreading of US political real
ity
Davidow also offers an insightful
interpretation of one of the most
contentious issues facing the neigh

boring countries: drug trafficking.
His discussion includes a thought
ful assessment of the detrimental
effect of the so-called “certification”
process. Every year, until the law
was revised in 2002, the US
Congress required the president to
certify countries’ cooperation with
US anti-narcotics programs.
Countries that were not certified
risked losing US foreign aid. In
practical terms, Mexico’s certifica
tion as an ally in the war against
drugs was little more than an
empty threat. A decision not to
certify Mexico would have present
ed the US with a security, immigra
tion and trade problem that the
country could not afford. And in
any case, Mexico receives little
financial help from the United
States. Nevertheless, Mexico cares
deeply about its international image
and resented the humiliating annu
al ritual. Says Davidow: “The most
negative effect of the certification
law was that for years it focused
Mexican attention on an extraneous
issue—the perceived American
arrogance inherent in the process of
judging others— and, in doing so,
provided a pretext for Mexico to
ignore the reality of its drug scene.”
While pointing out some of the
many misunderstandings that per
meate the bilateral relationship,
Davidow also underscores initia
tives that have helped strengthen
constructive communication
between the two neighbors. In par
ticular, he credits the annual meet
ings of the Binational Commission,
which bring together cabinet mem
bers from both countries and pro
vide them with the opportunity to
bond with their foreign counter
parts. Perhaps even more impor
tant, under pressure to show “deliv
erables,” the meetings often force
the two bureaucracies to create aca
demic exchange programs, informa
tion-sharing systems, and innumer

able other tangible products that
effectively reinforce US-Mexican
relations year after year.
The ambassador is a firm believer
that a greater level of convergence
between the two countries is
inevitable. In this vein, he con
cludes the book by envisioning the
potential for a common currency,
open borders and even a North
American parliament. Davidow is
anything but naive and recognizes
the political hurdles these proposals
entail. But instead of discarding
them outright, he suggests concrete
initiatives to promote increased
integration: a customs union with
common external tariffs; a joint leg
islative commission to hold hear
ings and legislate separately on
common issues; and increasing the
number of Mexican guest workers
allowed into the United States.
Whether or not Davidow’s vision
becomes a reality or remains a pipe
dream, he has already contributed
to an improved understanding of
the United States’ relationship with
its southern neighbor. His first
hand account of the dynamics and
issues that complicate the interac
tion between the two countries is
difficult to find in academic vol
umes, and he presents his experi
ences with a candor that readers on
both sides of the border will find
invaluable. Add the gossip and it
makes for a very enjoyable read. ■

Juan Carlos Gamboa, PhD is a sen
ior vice president fo r governm ent
affairs at the M iami office o f
Fleishman-Hillard, an international
communications firm .
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US-Latin American Relations
by M arian Goslinga

he United States has a
Cooper, Andrew F. “The Making
long history of
of the Inter-American Democratic
involvement in and
Charter: A Case o f Complex
with Latin America.
Multilateralism.” International
The relationship has
Studies Perspective 5, no. 1
varied from intense adulation
to
(February
2004): 92-113. (Dis
benign neglect— as dictated by US
cusses US—Latin American relations
interests. Although at present the
within the framework of the
US has its attention focused else
Organization of American States.)
where in the world, events and
issues in Latin America remain a
Corbin, Heather. “The Proposed
matter of ongoing concern.
United States-Chile Free Trade
For a chronology of the 55 US
Agreement: Reconciling Free Trade
interventions in Latin America
and Environmental Protection.”
since 1890, see http://www2.truColorado Journal o f International
man.edu/ "marc/ resources/intervenEnvironmental Law an d Policy 15,
tions.html, a website maintained by
no. 1 (Winter 2003): 119-142.
Truman State University. The bib
liography that follows deals with
Davidow, Jeffrey. The U.S. and
some of these events, as well as
Mexico: The Bear and the
other aspects of a relationship that
Porcupine. Princeton, N.J.:
has veered between prickliness and
Markus Wiener Publishers, 2004.
affinity.
(Reviewed in this issue.)

Decisions 20 0 4 [Video Recording].
New York, N.Y.: Foreign Policy
Association, 2004. 2 videocassettes
(216 min.) (Tape 2 features Latin
America: The Price o f Neglect by
Bernard Aronson and Joy Olson.)

Castaneda, Jorge G. “NAFTA at
10: A Plus or a Minus?” Current
History, vol. 103 (February 2004):
51-55. (On the tenth anniversary
of the North American Free Trade
Agreement, the author summarizes
the major benefits and problems
that Mexico has accrued from closer
integration with the United States.)

Dobbins, James. A Fresh Start fo r
H aiti: Charting Future U.S.
Haitian Relations [Electronic
Resource]. Santa Monica, Calif.:
RAND, 2004. (Available on the
Web at http://www.rand.org/
publications/CT /C T 219/C T 219.
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Gangsters and Prostitutes
T a b l e 3 : P e r C a p it a G D P , I n c o m e D
R e m it t a n c e s

i s t r i b u t io n ,

continued from page 21

P e r C a p it a R e m it t a n c e s ,

and

A verag e H o u se h o ld

(US$)

(2002)

Remittances
per capita
(2002 )

Average annual
remittances
received by
recipient
households

530

480

230

1,590

2,080

300

350

230

2,300

Costa Rica

4,100

n/a

n/a

n/a

2,800

Guatemala

1,750

340

400

140

2,150

Honduras

920

90

130

110

2,060

3,740

770

890

100

3,020

470

50

80

130

1,170

Annual per
capita GDP
(2002)

GDP per
capita of
poorest 20%
(2002)

GDP per
capita of
poorest 40%

Dominican Republic

2,080

El Salvador

Country

Mexico
Nicaragua

Source: Report of the Inter-American Dialogue Task Force on Remittances (2004).

crucial social safety net, as the InterAmerican Dialogue task force noted:
“In Honduras, Nicaragua, El
Salvador, and a few other of Latin
Americas poorest nations, remit
tances may be more than doubling
the incomes of the poorest 20 per
cent of the population.”
Remittances are essential to the qual
ity of life of the poor and even the
middle class, and they relieve
demands and pressures on govern
ment social services (see Table 3).
As North and Central America
and the Dominican Republic inte
grate economically and converge
under CAFTA, dependence on the
United States will increase, as will
the asymmetry in their relations.
That is, Central America and the
Dominican Republic will remain rel
atively unimportant to the average
American as the United States
becomes even more important to
Central Americans and Dominicans.
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Except for trade and immigration
issues, US foreign policy towards the
region since the end of the Cold War
has been an “afterthought.” The
Central American countries barely
register as blips on Washingtons
radar screen; in contrast, the United
States is domestic politics in Central
America. One need only compare
the massive architecture of US
embassy buildings in the region with
the government buildings of the host
countries.
In sum, while the redefinition of
national and international security
partly explains the Central American
and Dominican governments’ sup
port of the US-led invasion of Iraq,
the real reasons lie in the feared costs
of challenging the United States at a
sensitive time. The dominant
neoliberal elites of these countries
simply could not, and cannot, jeop
ardize their increasingly beneficial
political and economic relationships

with the United States. Their gov
ernments supported the United
States in Iraq primarily out of prag
matic considerations of dependent
vulnerability and feared retribution.
To close with Stanley Kubrick’s anal
ogy, these small nations, like prosti
tutes, are consummate pragmatists.
They have to be. ■
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